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I.    INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, courts recognized the presumption of innocence as an 
undoubted principle of criminal law.1  In fact, the presumption was 
substantially embodied within Roman law.2  Unless “competent evidence” 
proves otherwise, “[t]he law presumes that [individuals] charged with a 
crime are innocent.”3  The presumption stands as “sufficient protection” 
unless disproven beyond a reasonable doubt.4  Today, this maxim remains 
one of the most cherished notions of fundamental fairness, and an essential 
component within the American judicial system.5  As Justice Berger opined: 
To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may 
undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process.  In the administration of 
criminal justice, courts must carefully guard against dilution of the principle 
 
1. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453–54 (1895) (“It is stated as unquestioned in the 
textbooks, and has been referred to as a matter of course in the decisions of this court and in the courts 
of several states.”). 
2. Id. at 454–55. 
3. Id. at 452. 
4. Id. 
5. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (“The right to a fair trial is a fundamental 
liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453 (“The principle that there is a 
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and 
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”). 
2
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2020], No. 4, Art. 5
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss4/5
  
2020] COMMENT 1003 
that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt.6 
Our state and federal constitutions have long emphasized substantive and 
procedural safeguards necessary to ensure fair and impartial trials.7  To 
further protect our trial system, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (The Rules).8  The Rules govern evidentiary procedures during 
trials by “eliminat[ing] unjustifiable expense and delay, and promot[ing] the 
development of evidence law.”9  In criminal trials, for example, the Rules 
seek to limit certain evidence that could unduly prejudice a defendant.10   
Understandably, the drafters could not anticipate every clever technique 
lawyers devise to circumvent the Rules’ primary purpose.11  Character 
evidence, in particular, allows prosecutors to strategically parade a 
defendant’s prior bad acts before juries.  Although character evidence is 
generally inadmissible “to prove that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance” with such character,12 Rule 404(a) provides three 
exceptions that allow courts to admit otherwise excludible evidence.13  
Additionally, Rule 404(b) prohibits introducing evidence of defendants’ 
prior bad acts14 “to show that on a particular occasion [they] acted in 
 
6. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503.  Justice Burger further warned that “[t]he actual impact of a particular 
practice on the judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined.”  Id. at 504.  Accordingly, “the 
probability of deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny.”  Id. 
7. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (returning to the “constitutional 
principles established to achieve a fair system of justice” by recognizing a criminal defendant’s right to 
counsel). 
8. See generally 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 5007 (2d ed. 2015) (summarizing the history of the Rules’ enactment). 
9. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
10. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, JR., supra note 8, at 201. 
11. See Symposium, Rule 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence: The Need for a Two-Step Analysis, 71 NW. U. 
L. REV. 635, 635 (1977) (stressing the fears that a defendant will receive an unfair trial if the jury learns 
about the defendant’s prior criminal acts). 
12. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
13. Id. R. 404(a)(2)–(3).  The first of these exceptions allows the defendant to introduce 
evidence of a pertinent trait.  Id. R. 404(a)(2)(A).  If the defendant “opens the door,” the prosecution 
is allowed to provide rebuttable evidence.  Id. R. 404(a)(2)(A).  Additionally, defendants “may offer 
evidence of an alleged victim’s pertinent trait.”  Id. R. 404(a)(2)(B).  If admitted, the prosecution may 
offer counter evidence and also “offer evidence of the defendant’s same trait.”  Id. R. 404(a)(2)(B)(i)–
(ii).  The last exception allows character evidence of a witness to be admitted under Rules 607, 608, 
and 609.  Id. R. 404(a)(3). 
14. Throughout this Comment, “prior bad acts” is used to refer to a defendant’s uncharged 
misconduct, all extrinsic act evidence and extraneous offenses. 
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accordance with the character” of which they are accused of having.15  
Nevertheless, Rule 404(b) allows prosecutors to introduce a defendant’s 
prior bad acts for non-character purposes.16  For example, prosecutors may 
offer the defendant’s prior bad acts to prove “motive,17 opportunity,18 
intent,”19 or a number of other reasons.20  Such circumstantial evidence is 
often considered the “forbidden inference” because it creates a risk that a 
defendant’s propensity to act a particular way “will be inferred from his prior 
acts, rather than from the conduct in question at trial.”21 
Courts have expressed concern that 404(b) may overcomplicate issues, 
and that “particularly if there is a dispute about whether the defendant 
committed the other acts, introduction of evidence concerning those acts 
could be time-consuming and distract the factfinder from the central issues 
in the case.”22  With limited guidance from the Supreme Court, federal 
courts have misapprehended 404(b) and effectively rendered its purpose 
useless.23  Moreover, circuits have developed conflicting burdens of 
proof24 and inconsistent tests to determine the admissibility of a 
 
 
15. Id. R. 404(b)(1). 
16. See id. R. 404(b)(2) (“This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident.”). 
17. See United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1567 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The district court also 
did not err in refusing to allow the cross-examination to show that Hill had a motive to lie about the 
events in question.”). 
18. See United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 221 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Evidence used to establish 
opportunity is evidence that shows ‘access to or presence at the scene of the crime’ or the possession 
of ‘distinctive or unusual skills or abilities employed in the commission of the crime charged.’”). 
19. See United States v. Smith, 789 F.3d 923, 930 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding the district court did 
not abuse its discretion by admitting the defendant’s prior conviction as relevant to the defendant’s 
knowledge and intent). 
20. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
21. Theodore J. Froncek, Note, Proof of Prior Act Evidence, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 613, 614 (1980). 
22. Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA 
L. REV. 777, 777 (1981). 
23. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to Prove 
Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 
588 (1990) (observing how courts substantially undermine the character evidence prohibition by 
continuing to admit uncharged misconduct). 
24. See Froncek, supra note 21, at 613 (discussing the “varying standards of proof [regarding 
404(b)] that the circuits have developed and suggest[ing] the proper approach to resolve the question”); 
Jason Tortora, Note, Reconsidering the Standards of Admission for Prior Bad Acts Evidence in Light of Research 
on False Memories and Witness Preparation, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 1534 (2013) (encouraging a 
different approach to the standard of proof). 
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defendant’s prior bad acts.25 
A defendant’s past misdeeds can have damaging effects on their trial.26  
Moreover, despite efforts to amend Rule 404(b), the rule has remained 
virtually untouched.  In fact, Rule 404(b) is one of the most litigated 
evidence rules and has generated more published opinions than any other 
subsections of the rules.27  This Comment proposes a solution that limits 
the prosecution from admitting 404(b) evidence, restores courtroom 
fairness, and strengthens the presumption of innocence.28 
This Comment first explores the genesis of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  The first segment (Section II of this Comment) provides 
Rule 404(b)’s historical background, and Rule 105’s ineffective attempt to 
correct misusing a defendant’s prior bad acts.  Section II also outlines 
Texas’s approach to 404(b) evidence, which should serve as a guide for 
changing the federal rule.  In support of this Comment’s proposal, 
Section III analyzes psychological factors that influence a jury’s inability to 
disregard inadmissible evidence, despite instructions for them to do so.  
Section IV examines the difficulties defense counsel faces when 
representing defendants with prior bad acts.  Finally, this Comment 
proposes two solutions to the fictitious ban against a defendant’s prior bad 
acts.  Specifically, Rule 404(b) must be amended to exclude a defendant’s 
prior bad acts unless the defendant “opens the door.”  The Rule should also 
include a misuse provision to allow the trial court to render a mistrial if it 
determines the prosecution improperly introduced 404(b) evidence. 
 
25. Compare United States v. Williams, 534 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 2008) (outlining the four-part 
tested used by the Eighth Circuit), with United States v. Fasciana, 226 F. Supp. 2d 445, 455 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining the three-part test used by the Second Circuit). 
26. See Paul S. Milich, The Degrading Character Rule in American Criminal Trials, 47 GA. L. REV. 775, 
780 (2013) (“Once the jury learns that the defendant has a criminal past, the odds of conviction 
skyrocket.”); see also Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to 
Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 295 n.18 (2008) 
(providing evidence concerning the negative effect prior convictions have on juries). 
27. According to the Advisory Committee: “Rule 404(b) has emerged as one of the most cited 
Rules in the Rules of Evidence.  And in many criminal cases evidence of an accused’s extrinsic acts is 
viewed as an important asset in the prosecution’s case against an accused.”  FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory 
comm. note to 1991 amend. 
28. See Kuhns, supra note 22, at 777 (“Evidence that a defendant has been violent once or twice 
in the past . . . shows that the defendant has the capacity for violence, but such evidence is not very 
probative of the issue whether the defendant was in fact violent on a particular occasion.”); H. Richard 
Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice In the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 845, 868 (1982) (“Smuggling propensity evidence into a criminal prosecution must be taken as a 
fairly serious offense to some cherished notions of fairness.”). 
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Alternatively, Rule 404(b) must increase the burden of proof prosecutors 
must satisfy before a jury may consider a defendant’s prior bad acts, while 
limiting permitted uses.  Courts must also enforce current disciplinary 
measures under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which 
caution prosecutors from improperly injecting prejudicial evidence during a 
trial.  Both options seek to further the Rules’ primary purpose by ensuring 
defendants are tried for what they allegedly did—not for who they are. 
II.    BACKGROUND 
Until 1975, much of the law surrounding evidence rules originated from 
common law.29  Between 1939 and 1953, several attempts were made to 
promulgate a set of evidence rules, but none were immediately accepted.30  
As momentum grew, Congress considered adopting a set of uniform federal 
evidence rules.31  The Supreme Court subsequently formed an Advisory 
Committee on Rules of Evidence,32 which developed a set of evidence 
rules.33  After years of drafting, debates, and several revisions, the 
Supreme Court promulgated a set of rules and forwarded them to Congress 
for approval.34  The Rules sat idle for three years before finally passing both 
the House and Senate.35  On January 1, 1975, President Ford officially 
signed the Federal Rules of Evidence into law.36 
For over forty years, the Federal Rules of Evidence have governed trial 
procedure in federal courts to safeguard against admitting unreliable, 
irrelevant, and untrustworthy evidence.37  Several attempts have been made 
to amend Rule 404(b).  And, until recently, the Rule has remained virtually 
unchanged.38 
 
29. See Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 
909 (1978) (“The legal background against which the Rules were drafted and enacted was a vast 
collection of common law precedents.”). 





35. Id. § 5006. 
36. Id. 
37. See id. § 5007 (detailing the history of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
38. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules to the Comm. on 
Rules of Practice. and Procedure, at 397–401 (May 14, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ev_report_1.pdf (exemplifying unsuccessful attempts to amend the Rules). 
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In April of 2018, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules convened 
and unanimously approved a proposal to amend Rule 404(b).39  The 
Advisory Committee sent the proposed amendment to the Standing 
Committee with the recommendation to release for “public comment.”40  
During the meeting, committee members debated the purpose of 404(b).  
One member argued “that 404(b) is the most critical rule of evidence in a 
criminal case and that the real reason that other acts are offered is in fact to 
suggest the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes.”41  According to the 
report, the Committee monitored “significant developments in the case law 
on Rule 404(b), governing admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.”42  
Recognizing the need to carefully apply the Rule, several circuits “set forth 
criteria for that more careful application.”43  The Advisory Committee sent 
the proposed amendment to the Standing Committee with the 
recommendation to release for “public comment,” which ended 
February 15, 2019.44 
After what seemed to be a promising attempt to rectify direly needed 
revisions, the amendments fell short of necessary substantive changes to 
Rule 404(b).45  However, one change the Committee agreed to was a more 
stringent notice requirement, which expanded the Government’s obligation 
under Rule 404(b)’s current notice requirement.46  Specifically, the 
Government soon will be required to “articulate in the notice the non-
propensity purpose for which the prosecutor intends to offer the evidence 
 
39. Id. at 402. 
40. Id. 
41. Advisory Comm. on Evidence, Meeting Minutes (Apr. 26–27, 2018), https://www.us 
courts.gov/sites/default/files/ev_minutes_april_2018_final_0.pdf. 
42.  Memorandum from the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules to the Comm. on Rules of 
Practice. and Procedure, supra note 38 at 400. 
43. Id.  The proposed amendment focused on three areas: 
1) Requiring the prosecutor not only to articulate a proper purpose but to explain how the bad 
act evidence proves that purpose without relying on a propensity inference; 
2) Limiting admissibility of bad acts offered to prove intent or knowledge where the defendant 
has not actively contested those elements; and 
3) Limiting the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine, under which bad act evidence is not covered 
by Rule 404(b) because it proved a fact that is inextricably intertwined with the charged crime. 
Id. at 400–01. 
44. Id. at 402. 
45. See id. at 401 (determining the amendments would “make the Rule more complex without 
rendering substantial improvement.”). 
46. Id. 
7
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and the reasoning that supports the purpose.”47  The Committee also 
agreed to restore Rule 404(b)’s current heading to its previous phrasing: 
“other crimes, wrongs, or acts.”48  Doing so “would clarify that Rule 404(b) 
applies to crimes, wrongs and acts other than those charged.”49 
Despite numerous attempts to amend Rule 404(b), the Rule has remained 
virtually unchanged.50  Although no substantive changes were made, the 
Committee’s modest revisions illustrate a positive trend towards limiting 
404(b) evidence and further protecting a defendant’s right to a fair and 
impartial trial. 
A. Introducing a Defendant’s Prior Bad Acts 
Character is a combination of qualities that make an individual distinctive 
from others.51  For example, one who is honest, law-abiding, and 
trustworthy suggests a person of good character, while one who is malicious, 
unreliable, or impulsive connotes a person of bad character.  Our inherent 
nature to judge people by their good or bad attributes exemplifies the danger 
of using character evidence in trials because we assume individuals are 
unlikely to deviate from their routine behavior.  Legally speaking, character 
evidence demonstrates a person’s propensity to act a certain way.52  Thus, 
one who repeatedly commits robberies may be characterized as a habitual 
thief or robber. 
At common law, most jurisdictions applied character evidence as an 
“exclusionary” rule.53  Under this approach, a defendant’s prior bad act was 
“presumptively inadmissible unless the proponent established that the 
evidence was offered to prove circumstantially an element of the case.”54  
Unfortunately, Rule 404(b) adopted the minority view’s inclusionary 
 
 
47. Id.  Under the proposed amendment, a defendant no longer has to make a request before 
notice is provided.  Id. at 422.  Also, the Government must sufficiently notify opposing counsel in 
writing “to give the defendant a fair opportunity to meet the evidence.”  Id. at 450. 
48. Id. at 401.  The committee reasoned changing the title to its original form “clarif[ies] that 
Rule 404(b) applies to other acts and not the acts charged.”  Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. (summarizing various suggested amendments that were ultimately not implemented 
because they were found “unlikely to do any better than the courts are already doing . . . .”). 
51. Character, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
52. DAVID A. SCHLUETER & JONATHAN D. SCHLUETER, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE 
MANUAL § 404.02[1], at 210 (10th ed. 2015). 
53. Froncek, supra note 21, at 614 n.7. 
54. Id. at 613–14. 
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approach, which presumes a defendant’s prior acts are admissible.55 
Our justice system rejects prejudging individuals based on their prior 
criminal acts.  As Justice Jackson explained: 
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come 
to disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant’s 
evil character to establish a probability of his guilt.  Not that the law invests 
the defendant with a presumption of good character, but it simply closes the 
whole matter of character, disposition and reputation on the prosecution’s 
case-in-chief.  The State may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, 
specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts 
might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator 
of the crime.  The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on 
the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade 
them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair 
opportunity to defend against a particular charge.  The overriding policy of 
excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical 
experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair 
surprise and undue prejudice.56 
As previously noted, Rule 404(b) prohibits admitting a defendant’s prior 
bad acts to prove the defendant’s propensities.57  Yet, prosecutors may 
freely admit such evidence under a non-exhaustive list of exceptions,58 or 
 
55. See United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Because Rule 404(b) is a rule 
of inclusion, we presume that evidence of ‘other crimes, acts, or wrongs’ is admissible to prove motive, 
opportunity, [or] intent . . . unless the party seeking its exclusion can demonstrate that it serves only to 
prove the defendant’s criminal disposition.”); United States v. Kandiel, 865 F.2d 967, 972 (8th Cir. 
1989) (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion permitting admission of ‘other crimes’ evidence unless it tends 
to prove only the defendant’s criminal disposition.”); see also Daniel Capra & Liesa L. Richter, Character 
Assassination: Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B) to Protect Criminal Defendants, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
769, 786 (2018) (“In sum, a review of federal case law governing the admissibility of uncharged acts by 
criminal defendants reveals a disturbing pattern.  Appellate courts routinely start from a faulty premise 
that Rule 404(b) is a ‘rule of inclusion,’ which presumes admissibility of other-acts evidence.”). 
56. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
57. See United States v. Lane, 323 F.3d 568, 579 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 404(b) is inapplicable 
where the ‘bad acts’ alleged are really direct evidence of an essential part of the crime charged.”). 
58. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (“This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such 
as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 
lack of accident.”); see United States v. Wilson, 31 F.3d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other misconduct is not admissible to show that the defendant acted 
in conformity therewith, but may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity.”); United States v. Jacobson, 578 F.2d 
863, 866 (10th Cir. 1978) (recognizing Rule 404(b) evidence is generally excluded, but may be 
9
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without proving the defendant actually committed the acts.59  Although the 
evidence is not offered to demonstrate a defendant’s propensities, the jury 
is left to make the inference for themselves.  The “propensity inference” 
allows the jury to infer that because the defendant possesses a particular 
trait, he acted in accordance with that trait and likely committed the charged 
offense.60  For example, assume a defendant is charged with selling heroin, 
and was previously convicted of selling cocaine.  The jury may infer that the 
defendant has the propensity to sell illegal drugs.  Generally, a limiting 
instruction would attempt to prevent this inference.  However, as outlined 
below, instructing a jury to limit the evidence for a specific purpose is 
ineffective. 
Rule 404’s legislative history recognizes that character evidence is “an 
important asset in the prosecution’s case,”61 and advises prosecutors to 
refrain from misusing character evidence.62  Nevertheless, prosecutors 
continue to brandish a defendant’s past misdeeds with little oversight.63  
 
admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident” (citations omitted)). 
59. Some lower courts do require the proponent to prove the defendant actually committed the 
prior bad act.  See United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[T]estimony regarding 
[the defendant’s prior] escape from the Arkansas Corrections Facility and the theft of the Arkansas 
Department of Corrections vehicle was relevant to establish identity.”); United States v. Feinberg, 
535 F.2d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 1976) (“It is well established that evidence of prior criminal acts is 
admissible on the issues of a defendant’s specific criminal intent if (1) the prior act is similar enough 
and close enough in time to be relevant, (2) the evidence of the prior act is clear and convincing . . . .”); 
United States v. Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819, 826 (6th Cir. 1975) (“[E]vidence of misconduct not charged in 
an indictment is not admissible at trial, but, where, as here, such evidence tends logically to prove an 
element of the offense charged, an exception is made to the general rule.” (citation omitted)). 
60. See Milich, supra note 26, at 778 (showing the propensity inference causes juries to overvalue 
the evidence).  As one commentator noted: 
Judges are taught that propensity inferences occupy the illegitimate, prejudicial side of the 
balancing scale, while relevant, nonpropensity uses of character evidence are legitimate.  In 
practice, however, the propensity inference is an unreliable proxy for undesirable character 
evidence, and efforts to faithfully apply the propensity rule often lead to confusion and 
frustration. 
Id. at 785. 
61. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendments. 
62. See United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1317–18 n.5 (10th Cir. 1983) (“The legislative 
history of Rule 404 suggests that the policy of protecting the accused should be embraced in good faith 
by prosecutor and judge.  Accordingly, the onus of showing that prejudice over-balanced by need and 
good faith should rest on the Government.  This may call for prosecutorial restraint.”) (quoting 2 
WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE 404–45 (1981)). 
63. See Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 588 (observing how courts substantially undermine the 
character evidence prohibition by continuing to admit uncharged misconduct). 
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Furthermore, trial judges are given broad discretion to admit 404(b) 
evidence.64  As one commenter suggested, “the character rule is steadily 
losing ground and is perhaps on its way to disappearing.”65   
Evidence of a defendant’s other crimes must be relevant to prove an issue 
in the case.66  Under Rule 403, a court may exclude otherwise relevant 
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of 
one or more [factors].”67  However, admitting relevant propensity evidence 
taints the jury’s perception of the defendant, and should be strictly limited.68  
In Old Chief v. United States,69 the Supreme Court held that a district court 
abused its discretion for rejecting the defendant’s willingness “to concede a 
 
64. See United States v. Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 159 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Mark, 
943 F.2d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1991) (“The admission of evidence by the district court under Rule 404(b) 
may be overturned only for an abuse of discretion.”); see also United States v. Bailey, 990 F.2d 119, 122 
(4th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Haney, 914 F.2d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The admission of 
evidence, including such as may be offered under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), is committed to 
the discretion of the trial court, and its action will not be overturned on appeal unless its decision is 
shown to be arbitrary or irrational.”); see also United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649, 659 (7th Cir. 
1980) (holding that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony of the defendant’s 
prior criminal acts), abrogated by Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985).  In Berkwitt, a defendant 
was convicted of illegally transporting stolen property, and willfully violating federal copyright laws.  
Id. at 651.  Over objection, the government sought to admit testimony from three individuals who 
bought the defendant’s merchandise, as proof that the defendant knew his acts were illegal.  See id. 
at 654 (explaining evidence to be admitted by the government).  The defense argued the testimony was 
“irrelevant and concerning a period of time too remote from the time of their challenged conduct to 
have sufficient probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect.”  Id.  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit 
held the evidence to be relevant and the “cautionary instruction given to the jury” was within the trial 
judge’s discretion.  Id. at 655–56. 
65. See Milich, supra note 26, at 777. 
66. See Fed. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in 
determining the action.”); see also United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 220 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting 
courts “must always determine whether[] one of the factors justifying admission of other acts’ evidence 
is material . . . and if so, whether the . . . evidence is probative of such factors”); United States v. Powell, 
587 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The basic criterion is that the evidence of other crimes must be 
relevant to prove an issue in the case.”). 
67. FED. R. EVID. 403.  Such factors include: “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  Id.; see also United 
States v. Terebecki, 692 F.2d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he more remote the extrinsic offense 
the less probative it is.”); Kuhns, supra note 22, at 777 (“Evidence that a defendant has been violent 
once or twice in the past . . . shows that the defendant has the capacity for violence, but such evidence 
is not very probative of the issue whether the defendant was in fact violent on a particular occasion.”). 
68. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (“’[P]ropensity evidence’ is 
relevant . . .[but] creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance.”). 
69. Id. at 172. 
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prior judgement and,” instead, admitted the entire judgment record.70  Old 
Chief was charged under federal law for possessing a firearm with a prior 
felony conviction.71  At trial, Old Chief moved to prohibit the government 
from admitting the nature of his prior assault conviction.72  Over objection, 
the trial court allowed the government to admit Old Chief’s prior 
conviction,73 despite his offer to concede his prior misconduct.74  The 
Supreme Court disagreed.75  Writing for the majority, Justice Souter 
explained that events behind a defendant’s prior convictions could not be 
“proper nourishment for the jurors’ sense of obligation to vindicate the 
public interest.”76  Moreover, all the jury needed to know was that Old 
Chief’s prior conviction “f[ell] within the class of crimes that Congress 
thought should bar a convict from possessing a gun.”77 
As the Fifth Circuit articulated in United States v. Myers,78 “A concomitant 
of the presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for what 
he did, not for who he is.”79  To protect against the prejudicial effects of 
admitting a defendant’s prior criminal acts, the Fifth Circuit outlined two 
conditions that must be satisfied prior to admitting the evidence.80  First, 
five threshold prerequisites must be satisfied.81  Second, the court must 
 
70. Id. 
71. See id. (indicating Defendant was convicted “of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm . . . .”). 
72. See id. at 175 (“[H]e moved for an order requiring the Government ‘to refrain from 
mentioning . . . any testimony from any witness regarding the prior criminal convictions of the 
Defendant . . . .’”). 
73. See id. at 177 (“[O]ver renewed objection, the Government introduced the order of 
judgment and commitment for Old Chief’s prior conviction.”). 
74. See id. (“Regardless of the defendant’s offer to stipulate, the government is entitled to prove 
a prior felony offense through introduction of probative evidence.” (citations omitted)). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 190. 
77. Id. at 190–91. 
78. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977). 
79. Id. at 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 448 (“An inference 
of identity from prior crimes can only arise when the elements of the prior offenses and the charged 
offense . . . are sufficiently distinctive to warrant an inference that the person who committed the prior 
offense also committed the offense on trial.”). 
80. Myers, 550 F.2d at 1044. 
81. See id. (outlining the five prerequisites that must be met).  Other circuits take a similar 
approach.  For example, the Eighth Circuit prohibits the prosecution from admitting a defendant’s 
prior bad acts unless the evidence is: “1) relevant to a material issue; 2) similar in kind and not overly 
remote in time to the crime charged; 3) supported by sufficient evidence; and 4) higher in probative 
value than prejudicial effect.”  United States v. Williams, 534 F.3d 980, 984 (quoting United States v. 
Walker, 470 F.3d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
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balance the probative value of the evidence of other crimes with any 
prejudice resulting from admitting a defendant’s prior criminal acts.82  A 
year later, in United States v. Beechum, the Fifth Circuit adopted a two-step 
analysis for determining the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence under 
Rule 404(b).83  In Beechum, a postal worker was indicted “for unlawfully 
possessing a silver dollar.”84  At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence 
regarding a separate incident involving stolen credit cards.85  The 
prosecution stipulated, and the trial court agreed, that the credit card 
evidence was relevant to the issue of intent.86  During cross-examination, 
the defendant admitted to possessing the stolen credit cards.87  On appeal, 
the Fifth Circuit upheld the defendant’s admission.88  The court reaffirmed 
that Rule 404(b) “follows the venerable principle that evidence of extrinsic 
offenses should not be admitted solely to demonstrate the defendant’s bad 
character.”89 
If the Government intends to use a defendant’s prior bad conduct, it must 
provide the defendant with reasonable notice before trial.90  The purpose 
 
82. See Myers, 550 F.2d at 1044 (“[T]he probative value of the evidence of other crimes must 
outweigh the prejudice to the defendant that may result from its admission.”). 
83. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[I]t must first determine[] 
that the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character.  Second, 
the evidence must possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice 
and must meet the other requirements of [R]ule 403.”); see generally United States v. Guerrero, 650 F.2d 
728 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying the two-step Beechum test). 
84. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 904. 
85. See id. (“[T]he Government introduced the credit cards and explained the circumstances 
surrounding their obtention.”). 
86. Id. 
87. See id. at 905 (“Beechum did admit . . . that the only credit cards he had were his own.”). 
88. See id. at 918 (“[W]e affirm Beechum’s conviction.”). 
89. Id. at 910.  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Goldberg argued that using the defendant’s 
uncharged misconduct to prove intent was clearly a propensity inference. 
Thus the majority thinks the rule unequivocally allows us to reason that because a defendant 
displayed an improper intent in the past, he is more likely to have an evil intent in the act for 
which he is tried.  How this differs from reasoning that the defendant has a “propensity” to act 
with evil intent is beyond reason; but the majority says the rule prohibits references based on 
propensity.  There simply are no such watertight compartments to be found, unless we engage in 
subtle and sophisticated metaphysical analysis. 
Id. at 920 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
90. FED. R. EVID. 404 (b)(2)(A)–(B) (“On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the 
prosecutor must: (A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence that the 
prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and (B) do so before trial–or during trial if the court, for good cause, 
excuses lack of pretrial notice.”). 
13
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of the notice requirement is “to reduce surprise and promote early 
resolution on the issue of admissibility.”91  Initially, the prosecution and 
defense were expected to request the information “in a reasonable and 
timely fashion,” without any time requirement.92  The notice requirement 
further requires prosecutors to disclose “how it intends to use the extrinsic 
evidence at trial,”93 and gives the trial court the discretion to determine 
whether the notice was sufficient.94 
B. The Limiting Instruction: An Ineffective Attempt to Prevent Misusing 404(b) 
If the defense is concerned that the jury will improperly consider the 
defendant’s prior bad acts, Federal Rule of Evidence 105 allows the defense 
to request a limiting instruction.95  Under Rule 105, defense counsel must 
timely and specifically object to the admissibility of the non-character 
evidence.96  Defense counsel must specifically ask the judge to instruct the 
jury that such evidence must be restricted to its proper scope.97  If properly 
instructed, a jury may not consider the evidence for any reason but for its 
limited non-character purpose.98 Failure to request a limiting instruction 
may have devastating consequences, which are discussed in greater detail in 
Section IV of this Comment. 
Rule 105 is designed to prevent the jury from considering potentially 
prejudicial evidence.  Nevertheless, the instruction itself is limited to the 
judge’s charge without any consequences on the jury, because the Rule 
 
91. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee’s note to 1991 proposed rules. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See id. (“The court in its discretion may, under the facts, decide that the particular request 
or notice was not reasonable, either because of the lack of timeliness or completeness.”). 
95. See FED. R. EVID. 105 (“If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for 
a purpose—but not against another party or for another purpose—the court, on timely request, must 
restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”). 
96. Id. 
97. Id.; see United States v. Mercado, 573 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2009) (determining whether the 
trial court properly admitted other act evidence by considering whether an appropriate limiting 
instruction was administered).  The following is an example of a jury instruction offered by the 
Fifth Circuit: “Evidence of a defendant’s character, inconsistent with those traits of character ordinarily 
involved in the commission of the crime charged, may give rise to a reasonable doubt, since you may 
think it improbable that a person of good character with respect to those traits would commit such a 
crime.”  DIST. JJ. ASS’N FIFTH CIR. COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM. CASES) § 1.09 (2015), Westlaw FEDCRIM-JI5C 1.09. 
98. See United States v. Mora, 768 F.2d 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he trial judge’s 
cautionary instruction on this issue was not only justified but required to carry out the purpose of the 
rule.”). 
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presumes jurors are able to limit evidence to its proper scope.99  In Bruton 
v. United States,100 the Supreme Court reasoned that limiting instructions do 
not “effectively protect the accused against the prejudicial effect of 
admitting in evidence the confession of a codefendant which implicated 
him.”101  In Bruton, a joint trial between Bruton and his codefendant Evans 
resulted in convictions of both for armed postal robbery.102  During the 
trial, the jury was instructed that the Evans’s confession was sufficient 
evidence against him, but that the confession was inadmissible hearsay 
against Bruton.103  Relying on Delli Paoli v. United States,104 the Court held 
that “because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instruction to the 
contrary, looked to incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining 
[Bruton]’s guilt, [admitting] Evan’s confession in [the] joint trial violated 
[Bruton]’s right to cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment.”105  In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart 
insisted that some evidence is “at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so 
difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the 
minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge 
might give.”106 
Although the Supreme Court recognizes that limiting instructions are 
seemingly unreliable, the Court continues to adhere to the rule that 
instructions are sufficient safeguards.107  To the contrary, psychological 
 
99. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) (holding admission of codefendant in 
joint trial violated the petitioner’s right of cross-examination); United States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526, 
1536 (9th Cir. 1991) (“In its evaluation, the court must respect the exclusive province of the jury to 
determine credibility of witnesses.”); but see Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (“The 
naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury all practicing 
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”). 
100. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123. 
101. FED. R. EVID. 105 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rule. 
102. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124. 
103. See id. at 125 (“[T]he trial judge instructed the jury that although Evans’ confession was 
competent evidence against Evans it was inadmissible hearsay against petitioner . . . .”). 
104. Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), overruled in part by Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
105. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126.  According to the Court: “there are some contexts in which the 
risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so 
vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”  
Id. at 135. 
106. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 138 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
107. See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 191 (1987) (reiterating the “general rule that jury 
instructions suffice to exclude improper testimony . . . .”). 
15
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research indicates that juries are unable to ignore inadmissible evidence.108  
There are numerous explanations as to why limiting instructions are 
ineffective.109  One theory is that jurors are unable to engage in effective 
“thought suppression.”110  Another explanation is that the instruction’s 
language might draw attention to the defendant’s prior bad acts.111  Because 
limiting instructions are insufficient to protect the defendant’s rights, 404(b) 
must include additional safeguards that ensure the prosecution does not 
improperly admit a defendant’s prior bad acts. 
C. A Look at Texas’s Approach to 404(b) Evidence 
With a few exceptions, the Texas Rules of Evidence mirror the Federal 
Rules.  Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) and its federal counterpart are 
substantially similar.112  In fact, the language of both rules is identical, with 
the Texas Rule also including a notice provision in criminal cases.113  Like 
the federal rule, Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) permits the prosecution to 
introduce a defendant’s extraneous offenses if they are relevant.114  
However, extraneous offenses that are not relevant are “absolutely 
inadmissible.”115  Some jurisdictions refer to extraneous offenses as 
“uncharged misconduct,”116 while others refer to them as “extrinsic 
 
108. See generally Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 751–
52 (1959) (discussing data collected about a jury’s ability to ignore inadmissible evidence); Bruce Rind 
et al., Effect of Crime Seriousness on Simulated Jurors’ Use of Inadmissible Evidence, 135 J. SOC. PSY. 417 (1995) 
(“[J]urors cannot completely ignore the inadmissible evidence, particularly when it is significant.”); 
Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A 
Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 472 (2006) (showing “a significant impact on inadmissible 
evidence on juror verdicts despite the use of judicial instructions to disregard . . . .”). 
109. See Daniel M. Wegner & Ralph Erber, The Hyperaccessibility of Suppressed Thoughts, 63 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 903, 903 (1992) (comparing “the accessibility of suppressed thoughts” 
with “the accessibility of thoughts on which subjects were consciously trying to concentrate.”). 
110. Id. 
111. See Broeder, supra note 108, at 754; Rind et al., supra note 108, at 417. 
112. See SCHLUETER & SCHLUETER, supra note 52, at 210 (“Both Rules, subject to several 
exceptions, generally bar the admission of character evidence when it is used circumstantially to prove 
that a person acted in conformity with that character.”). 
113. Id. at 228. 
114. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); see also Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1990) (discussing relevancy as a necessary prerequisite to introducing character evidence). 
115. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387. 
116. See Manning v. State, 114 S.W.3d 922, 926–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“An extraneous 
offense is any act of misconduct, whether resulting in prosecution or not, that is not shown in the 
charging papers.  It is an offense that is ‘extra, beyond, or foreign to the offense for which the party is 
on trial.’”). 
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offense” evidence.117  Nonetheless, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
has explained that an extraneous offense is prejudicial “because ‘the accused 
has no notice he will be called upon to defend against it.’”118 
Prior to 1994, Texas’s standard of proof for admitting extrinsic evidence 
was known as the “clear proof standard.”119  The Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals later clarified this standard, and now prosecutors must prove the 
defendant actually committed the alleged acts.120  For example, in Fischer v. 
State,121 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the extraneous offenses 
presented by the State at trial were “sufficient to support a finding beyond 
a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] committed [the offense].”122  In 
contrast, the federal rules do not require the Government to prove the 
defendant committed the extraneous offenses beyond a reasonable 
doubt.123 
Texas Rule 404(b), like its federal counterpart, requires prosecutors to 
provide the defendant with notice124 if the defendant submits a “timely” 
request.125  The State’s notice must provide the defendant with the prior 
bad acts it intends to offer during its case-in-chief.126  Although requesting 
 
117. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 898 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978). 
118. Manning, 114 S.W.3d at 926–27.  In Manning, evidence that the defendant had cocaine 
metabolite in his bloodstream one and a half hours after the accident was not considered an extraneous 
offense.  Id.  According to the court, the indictment alleged that consumption of a controlled substance 
caused the defendant’s recklessness.  Id. 
119. McCann v. State, 606 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).  Under the “clear” proof 
standard, extrinsic evidence was inadmissible unless there was a clear showing that: “1) the evidence 
of the extraneous offense is material, . . . 2) the accused participated in the extraneous transaction being 
offered into evidence, and 3) the relevancy to a material issue outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial 
potential.”  Id. 
120. See Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that the 
trial court did not err by admitting evidence that the defendant committed extraneous offenses of 
making obscene phone calls).  Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 
 121. Fischer v. State, 268 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 
122. Id. at 556.  Because the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant stole 
the murder weapon, it was able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant subsequently 
used the weapon to murder the victim.  Id.  As a matter of law, appellate courts may conclude that the 
prosecution failed to meet its burden under the totality of the evidence.  Higginbotham v. State, 
356 S.W.3d 584, 594 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d). 
123. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 682 (1988). 
124. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
125. Id. (“On timely request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must provide 
reasonable notice before trial that the prosecution intends to introduce such evidence—other than that 
arising in the same transaction—in its case-in-chief.”). 
126. SCHLUETER & SCHLUETER, supra note 52, at 234. 
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the information pre-trial can be advantageous for the defendant, it may also 
alert the prosecution of possible extraneous conduct.   
Similar to the Fifth Circuit, Texas has adopted a two-part test for 
admitting evidence of extraneous offenses or uncharged acts.127  Assuming 
the defense raises a sufficient 404(b) objection,128 the prosecution must first 
show the evidence is relevant to a material issue in the case.129  In Rankin 
v. State,130 for example, a defendant was found guilty of aggravated sexual 
assault.131  During the trial, the prosecution introduced extraneous evidence 
to demonstrate a common plan or scheme.132  Over objection, the trial 
court admitted the evidence.133  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
opined that introducing a defendant’s prior acts for something other than 
proving character is not “magically admissible.”134  Under Texas Rule of 
Evidence 403, relevancy demands that “the evidence makes a fact in 
consequence in the case more or less likely.”135  Because the trial court failed 
to bridge the gap between an elemental fact (intent) and the existence of a 
common plan or scheme, the court remanded the case for a thorough 
relevancy analysis.136 
If the court determines the evidence is relevant, the second step requires 
the court to balance the probative value of the evidence against its 
prejudicial or inflammatory effect.137  Prejudicial effects outweighing the 
evidence’s probative value may be excluded,138 while prejudicial dangers 
 
127. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387. 
128. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals suggested that defense counsel’s 404(b) objection 
be specific.  According to the court, “An objection that such evidence is not ‘relevant,’ or that it 
constitutes an ‘extraneous offense’ or ‘extraneous misconduct,’ although not as precise as it could be, 
ought ordinarily to be sufficient under the circumstances to apprise the trial court of the nature of the 
complaint.”  Id. 
129. Id. 
 130. Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 






137. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). 
138. E.g., Bishop v. State, 837 S.W.2d 431, 432 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1992), aff’d, 869 S.W.2d 
342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (agreeing with the defendant’s first point of error that “[t]he trial court 
erred in admitting evidence of [his] sexual proclivities and practices pursuant to Rule 404(b), Texas 
Rules of Criminal Evidence.”). 
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that do not substantially outweigh the probative value may be admitted.139  
Like federal judges, Texas trial judges have broad discretion to admit or 
exclude evidence.140  A reviewing court will “reverse the trial court’s 
judgment ‘rarely and only after a clear abuse of discretion.’”141 
Once the court conducts step two’s balancing requirement, the defense 
should request a limiting instruction.142  As discussed above, limiting 
instructions attempt to cure any error caused by admitting the extraneous 
offenses.143  Failure to request a limiting instruction may subject defense 
counsel to ineffective assistance of counsel claims on appeal.144  Problems 
associated with ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reserved for a 
later discussion in Section IV of this Comment. 
III.    PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The purpose of Rule 105’s limiting instructions is to prevent juries from 
considering otherwise inadmissible evidence.145  Rule 105 presumes that 
juries can limit the evidence for non-character purposes.  However, 
numerous studies reveal that asking jurors to disregard inadmissible 
evidence or to limit the scope of particular evidence is simply ineffective.146  
 
139. See generally Smith v. State, 105 S.W.3d 203 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. 
ref’d) (considering whether “the probative value of [the] statements were outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice”). 
140. See Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“The plain language of 
Rule 403, however, states all ‘relevant evidence’ is subject to its general balancing determination.”). 
141. Id. at 847. 
142. TEX. R. EVID. 105; see also SCHLUETER & SCHLUETER, supra note 52, at 247 (directing “the 
jury to consider the evidence only for the purpose of which it was offered.”). 
143. See Gonzalez v. State, 541 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no 
pet.) (“If the trial court determines the offered evidence has independent relevance apart from or 
beyond character conformity, the trial court may admit the evidence and instruct the jury the evidence 
is limited to the specific purpose the proponent advocated.”); see also Moody v. State, 827 S.W.2d 875, 
890 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“[E]xcept in extreme cases, if the trial court sustains a timely objection 
and instructs the jury to disregard an improper response referring to an extraneous offense, the error 
is cured.”). 
144. See Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d 142, 154 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d) 
(“Extraneous offenses are inherently prejudicial, and when counsel fails to object to numerous 
extraneous and prejudicial matters, counsel is ineffective.”); see also Ex Parte Varelas, 45 S.W.3d 627, 
632 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (concluding that trial counsel’s performance was deficient “for failing to 
request either an instruction on the burden of proof or limiting instructions regarding the extraneous 
act evidence admitting at [the defendant’s] trial.”). 
145. TEX. R. EVID. 105. 
146. Broeder, supra note 108, at 748; Rind et al., supra note 108, at 423 (1995); Steblay et al., supra 
note 108, at 469. 
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Below are four studies that demonstrate why more procedural safeguards 
are needed to ensure defendants receive a fair trial. 
A. The University of Chicago Law School Jury Project 
In the 1950s, the University of Chicago Law School began the Jury 
Project as part of an effort to integrate social sciences techniques into legal 
research.147  The project studied various aspects of juries, including the 
development of jury trials in the American court system.148  An important 
facet of the project was the experimental jury.149  The experiment provided 
jurors with tape recordings of mock trials based on an automobile 
accident.150  The jurors were given two versions of facts and asked to assess 
damages based on the disclosure of the defendant’s liability insurance.151  
In one version, the jurors were told the defendant was covered by liability 
insurance.152  In a second version, the jurors were told the defendant was 
covered by liability insurance, but were instructed not to consider that when 
assessing damages.153  The experiment found that the jury awarded 
damages higher in the latter version.  Specifically, the jury awarded $33,000 
in damages without an instruction, and $46,000 when given the limiting 
instruction.154  The study’s results indicate “that most criminal cases are 
decided during the trial and not during jury deliberations.”155  Additionally, 
the study found that limiting instructions had minimal impact on a juror’s 
adherence to the judge’s orders.156  The results were two-fold: “first, that 
juries tend to award less when they know that an individual defendant is not 
insured; and second, that where they know [the] defendant is insured and a 
fuss is made over it the verdict will be higher than when no such fuss was 
made.”  In other words, the objection and disregard “sensitize the jurors to 
the fact that defendant is insured and thereby increase the award.”157  Thus, 
the limiting instruction failed to serve its purpose. 
 
147. Broeder, supra note 108, at 744. 
148. Id. at 746. 
149. Id. at 753. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 753–54. 
153. Id. at 754. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 747. 
156. Id. at 754. 
157. Id. 
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B. Crime Seriousness on Simulated Jurors’ Use of Inadmissible Evidence 
In 1995, an experiment was conducted on the effect of crime seriousness 
on simulated jurors’ use of inadmissible evidence.158  The study examined 
conflicting theories concerning a jury’s inability to disregard inadmissible 
evidence.159  Specifically, the examiners focused on whether jurors were 
less willing to disregard prejudicial evidence in relation to the severity of the 
crime.160  The participants were provided with six variations of court 
proceedings and asked to evaluate the evidence.161  Each participant was 
further instructed to follow the judge’s instructions and render verdicts as if 
they were “actually on a jury.”162  The study found that inadmissible 
evidence biased jurors’ guilty judgments when the crime was less severe, 
“but not when the crime was relatively more serious or very serious.”163  It 
is worth noting that the simulation was not conducted during live courtroom 
proceedings, participants were provided with a fictitious case, and they did 
not actually partake in jury deliberations.164  What is significant about this 
study is that it demonstrates how damaging inadmissible evidence continues 
to factor into jury deliberations despite a judge’s instructions to disregard. 
C. Jury Deliberations and Inadmissible Evidence 
Five years later, a study “examine[d] the effect of jury deliberations on 
juror’s propensity to disregard inadmissible evidence.”165  According to this 
study, prior research was inconclusive regarding a jury’s ability to disregard 
judicial instructions.166  The researchers administered two experiments to 
determine whether inadmissible evidence affected juror’s decisions.167  The 
study found that mock juror bias was tempered following deliberations, 
 
158. Rind, et al., supra note 108, at 417. 
159. Id. at 417–18.  The research identified studies that found jurors were unable to ignore 
inadmissible evidence, others that found they could ignore the evidence, and one with mixed results.  
Id. at 417. 
160. Id. at 418 (“[The] purpose [of] this research was to conduct an experiment that varied crime 
seriousness while holding all other factors constant, to determine the impact of crime seriousness on 
simulated jurors’ use of inadmissible evidence.”). 
161. Id. at 419. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 422. 
164. Id. at 423. 
165. Kamala London & Narina Nunez, The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors’ Propensity to 
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despite their bias prior to deliberation.168  Specifically, experiment one 
revealed that “jury members’ predeliberation verdicts were biased by the 
presentation of inadmissible evidence.”169  Additionally, experiment two 
concluded that jurors “did not appear to accurately gauge the effect that the 
inadmissible evidence had on their verdicts.”170  This study differed from 
prior studies because it examined larger groups of mock jurors.171  
Moreover, the study “was designed to present the inadmissible evidence in 
a manner that could feasibly occur in court.”172  The results of this study 
further support the idea that jury instructions do not sufficiently protect 
defendants from the prejudicial effects of inadmissible evidence. 
D. Ineffective Judicial Instructions to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence 
A year after the jury deliberations study, the Augsburg College 
Department of Psychology used a meta-analysis to evaluate how judicial 
instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence affected juror verdicts.173  
The study examined “175 hypothesis tests from 48 studies with a combined 
8,474 participants.”174  The study revealed “inadmissible evidence [had] a 
reliable effect on verdicts consistent with the content of the inadmissible 
evidence.”175  Additionally, instructions to “ignore the inadmissible 
evidence [did not] effectively eliminate the inadmissible evidence 
impact.”176  The study further found that when judges provided a rationale 
for a ruling of inadmissibility, juror compliance may increase.177  Contested 
evidence ruled admissible highlighted such information, resulting in a 
detrimental impact on verdicts.178 
IV.    REPRESENTING A DEFENDANT WITH PAST MISDEEDS 
According to the Supreme Court, prosecutors are representatives “of a 
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 935. 
170. Id. at 937. 
171. Id. at 938. 
172. Id. 
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obligation to govern at all.”179  A prosecutor’s goal, therefore, is not solely 
“to win a case,” but to ensure that “justice shall be done.”180  In Berger v. 
United States, the Court admonished a federal prosecutor for his improper 
trial tactics,181 which included misstating facts during cross-examination, 
placing words in the witnesses’ mouths, and “conducting himself in a 
thoroughly indecorous and improper manner.”182  By admitting evidence 
that would prejudice a defendant’s case, prosecutors undoubtedly 
undermine their duty as representatives of the people.183   
Fifty years after Berger, the Supreme Court reasoned that inappropriate 
prosecutorial comments, alone, “[do] not justify a reviewing court to reverse 
a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding.”184  To 
reverse a conviction, reviewing courts must find that the prosecution’s 
tactics were calculated to produce a wrongful conviction.185  In Young, the 
Court voiced its concern against a prosecutor’s improper comments.186  
According to the Court: 
The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his 
personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such 
comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, 
but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and 
can thus jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the 
evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the 
imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the 
Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.187 
Because prosecutors operate with little oversight, prosecutorial 
misconduct is largely unreviewable.188  Therefore, defense counsel must 
 
179. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
180. Id. (“He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.  But, while he 
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”). 
181. Id. at 84 n.6. 
182. Id. 
183. See id. at 88 (“It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”). 
184. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 
185. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
186. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18–19. 
187. Id. 
188. See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 
713, 797 (1999) (discussing the prosecutor’s role as the “government’s advocate, and society’s 
representative” and the difficulty in policing prosecutorial misconduct). 
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thwart any attempt by the prosecution designed to generate a wrongful 
conviction.189  Making objections during trial is one method used to 
challenge the prosecution.  Objecting over the prosecution’s attempt to 
introduce 404(b) evidence, however, can negatively affect the defendant’s 
trial, which places defense counsel in a difficult situation. 
Two options are available to defense counsel when deciding whether to 
object over the prosecution’s introduction of a defendant’s prior bad 
acts.190  The first option is to object and preserve the record for review.191  
However, objections are known to “spotlight attention” on evidence, which 
triggers attentive jury responses.192  Thus, counsel risks highlighting his 
client’s alleged criminal history. 
Alternatively, defense counsel may choose to forgo objecting.  Of course, 
failing to object waives the error, and the defendant is precluded from 
raising the issue on appeal.193  Furthermore, even if counsel does object, he 
must further request a limiting instruction under Rule 105.194  Failing to 
object, or objecting without requesting a limiting instruction, subjects 
counsel to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.195  Each decision 
requires defense counsel to weigh the benefits and detriments of objecting 
thoroughly. 
A. Objections Highlight a Defendant’s Prior Bad Acts 
Both sides use objections to enforce evidentiary rules against the 
other.196  For example, if a prosecutor attempts to introduce a defendant’s 
 
189. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (“It is as much [a prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one.”). 
190. FED. R. EVID. 103(a). 
191. Id. 
192. Krystia Reed & Brian H. Bornstein, Objection! Psychological Perspectives on Jurors’ Perceptions of 
In-Court Attorney Objections, 63 S.D. L. REV. 1, 13 (2018). 
193. See Ex Parte Varelas, 45 S.W.3d 627, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“At the time of 
applicant’s direct appeal, we were unable to determine his attorney’s reasons for failing to object the 
omissions in the charge.”). 
194. See id. (“[R]easonable counsel would have requested the instructions given the facts of this 
case.”). 
195. See id. (concluding trial counsel’s performance was deficient “for failing to request either 
an instruction on the burden of proof or limiting instructions regarding the extraneous act evidence 
admitting at [the defendant’s] trial”).  But see United States v. Pittman, 319 F.3d 1010, 1012 (7th Cir. 
2003) (holding “trial counsel’s failure to object to the Rule 404(b) evidence was not objectively 
unreasonable and therefore did not constitute ineffective assistance”). 
196. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (“A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence 
only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and: (1) if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on 
24
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criminal history without an exception, and the defense properly objects, the 
evidence should be excluded.197  Objecting is one of the most important 
duties a lawyer is charged with.198  But objections are one of a number of 
courtroom interruptions.199  As one commenter stated, “Objections are 
intrusions on the trial—temporary halts due to an unexpected interruption 
initiated by one attorney that interrupts the continuity of the other attorney 
or witness.”200   
As noted, objections are known to “spotlight attention” on specific 
evidence, which may harm a lawyer’s credibility with the jury.201  Once an 
attorney objects, all proceedings immediately halt until the judge makes a 
ruling.202  The period between objection and ruling can affect the jury’s 
attention and memory.  Specifically, juries become more attentive when 
attorneys object.203  Under the “spotlight attention” theory, interruptions 
harness attention.204  When attorneys interrupt trials “‘by objecting, jurors’ 
attention and memory for the testimony might change.”205  Research 
further suggests that objecting highlights the information, which negatively 
influences jury verdicts.206  Consequently, drawing attention to a 
defendant’s prior bad acts can severely taint the jury’s verdict.207 
In Hilliard v. State,208 the Second Court of Appeals held that the 
prosecution’s comments during the defendant’s sentencing contributed to 
the defendant’s punishment.209  Hilliard was convicted of retaliation, and 
 
the record: (A) timely objects or moves to strike; and (B) states the specific ground, unless it was 
apparent from the context.”). 
197. Id. 
198. Reed & Bornstein, supra note 192, at 12. 
199. Id. (“Interruptions generally are defined as ‘incidents or occurrences that impede or 
delay . . . progress on [a task].’”).  Other interruptions include “intrusions, breaks distractions, and 
discrepancies.”  Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 13 (“Spotlight attention” . . . describes visual attention being focused on a particular 
element, like a spotlight.”). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 14. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 11. 
207. See Hilliard v. State, 881 S.W.2d 917, 921–22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994) (“We find the 
prosecutor’s line of questioning was error and we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this 
error did not contribute to Hilliard’s punishment.”). 
208. Id at 921. 
209. Id. 
25
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sentenced to eight years confinement.210  During sentencing, Hilliard took 
the stand and asked the jury to sentence him to probation,211 which placed 
his character at issue.212  The jury previously heard testimony that Hilliard 
threatened to kill the complainant.213  The jury’s attention was again drawn 
to the testimony when the prosecutor “improperly admitted photographs, 
focusing on the underlying, unadjudicated extraneous offense.”214  
Additionally, the prosecutor asserted “that anyone who did such a thing, 
regardless of the circumstances, belonged in prison.”215  On appeal, the 
court determined that the prosecution’s line of questioning highlighted 
Hilliard’s alleged prior acts and contributed to his punishment.216 
B. Overcoming Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
The second issue defense counsel must hurdle is deciding whether to 
object over the prosecutor’s introduction of the defendant’s prior criminal 
acts, and subsequently overcome ineffective assistance of counsel claims on 
appeal.217  To demonstrate trial counsel was ineffective under the Sixth 
Amendment,218 a defendant must satisfy Strickland’s two-pronged test.219  
First, the defendant must demonstrate that “counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed” under the 
Sixth Amendment.220  To do so, the defendant must prove that “counsel’s 
representations fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”221  
“Second, the defendant must show that such deficient performance 
prejudiced his defense.”222  Each prong must be demonstrated by a 








216. Id. at 921–22. 
217. Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d 142, 152 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d). 
218. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense.”). 
219. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 
220. Id. at 687. 
221. Id. at 688. 
222. Id. at 687. 
223. See id. (inferring each prong must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence); Hall, 
161 S.W.3d at 152 (requiring each prong to be established by a preponderance of the evidence). 
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Reviewing courts generally give an attorney’s performance substantial 
deference.224  In Ingham v. State,225 for example, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals reasoned that an attorney’s “failure to object to certain 
procedural mistakes or improper evidence does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”226  However, as the Fifth Circuit has recognized: “to 
pass over the admission of prejudicial and arguably inadmissible 
evidence . . . has no strategic value.”227   
In Hall v. State, the Sixth Court of Appeals held Hall’s defense counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s introduction of 
404(b) evidence.228  Hall was convicted of felony possession of a controlled 
substance and sentenced to sixty years confinement.229  During the trial, 
the State repeatedly referenced “Hall’s [prior] arrests for unadjudicated 
offenses.”230  Additionally, Hall’s counsel failed to object to the evidence 
and never requested a limiting instruction.231  On appeal, the Sixth Court 
of Appeals concluded that Hall’s extraneous offenses were irrelevant to the 
charged offense, and “were clearly objectionable and inadmissible.”232  
Because Hall’s extraneous offenses were highly prejudicial, Hall’s trial 
counsel “was deficient in failing to object.”233 
While defense counsel contemplates subjecting himself to ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, prosecutors are permitted to circumvent 
 
224. See Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Ortiz v. State, 
93 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“‘[I]f counsel’s reasons for his conduct do not appear in the 
record and there is at least the possibility that the conduct could have been legitimate trial strategy, we 
will defer to counsel’s decisions and deny relief on an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.’”). 
 225.  Ingham v. State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (“[J]udicial scrutiny of 
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and every effort made to eliminate the distorting 
effects of hindsight.”). 
226. See id. at 509 (“The right to effective assistance of counsel merely ensures the right to 
reasonably effective assistance.  The constitutional right to counsel does not mean errorless counsel 
whose competency or accuracy of representation is to be judged by hindsight.”); Weathersby v. State, 
627 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (“The effectiveness of counsel is to be judged by the 
totality of the representation.”).  It is worth noting that Texas adopted the Strickland standard as the 
test to determine whether trial counsel was ineffective.  Hall, 161 S.W.3d at 152. 
227. Lyons v. McCotter, 770 F.2d 529, 534–35 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that defense counsel’s 
“omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance”) (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 690). 
228. Hall, 161 S.W.3d at 154. 
229. Id. at 147. 
230. Id. at 153. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 154. 
233. Id. 
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Rule 404(b)’s prohibitions by simply alleging the defendant’s prior criminal 
acts are relevant for some other non-character purpose.234  Such conduct 
cannot be permitted in a judicial system designed to protect the rights of its 
citizens. 
V.    RECOMMENDATION 
Repealing Rule 404(b) and banning the prosecution from introducing the 
defendant’s prior bad acts is the quickest solution to protect the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.  Doing so would ensure the jury’s verdict is untainted by 
outside influence and rendered solely upon the relevant evidence of the case 
before it.  Unfortunately, the lack of substantive changes made to 
Rule 404(b) since its enactment suggests the Evidence Committee is unlikely 
to repeal the rule. 
A viable proposal, then, requires two factors: amending Rule 404(b) to 
restrict trial courts from admitting a defendant’s prior bad acts unless the 
defendant “opens the door,” such as Rule 404(a)(2)(A), and including within 
the rule an automatic mistrial provision for improperly commenting on the 
defendant’s prior bad acts.  Alternatively, the Federal Rules should limit the 
acceptable uses of 404(b) evidence, increase the burden of proof, and 
enforce current disciplinary measures under the code of professional 
conduct. 
A. Option One: The Defendant Holds the Key to 404(b) Evidence 
As noted above, the federal character evidence rules allow the defendant 
to introduce evidence of his or her pertinent traits.235  This is commonly 
referred to as “opening the door.”236  If the evidence is admitted, the 
prosecution may offer rebuttal character evidence.237  In United States v. 
McLaurin, McLaurin and Lowery were convicted of various conspiracy 
offenses under the Hobbs Act.238  At trial, both co-defendants relied on an 
 
234. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
235. Id. R. 404(a)(2)(A). 
236. See United States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372, 383 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[E]ven if the evidence 
were prohibited by Rule 404(b), the district court acted within its discretion by concluding that [the 
defendant] opened the door to its admission.”). 
237. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A). 
238. See McLaurin, 764 F.3d at 378.  McLaurin and his co-defendant were “charged with three 
counts of conspiracy arising directly from [a] stash-house sting,” which included: interfering with 
commerce by threats; possessing with intent to distribute cocaine; using or possessing a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense or crime of violence; and possessing of a firearm as a convicted 
28
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2020], No. 4, Art. 5
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss4/5
  
2020] COMMENT 1029 
entrapment defense.239  During cross-examination of one of the agents, 
Lowery suggested that statements he made during an undercover meeting 
about being “strapped” were simply “just talk,” and that there was “no 
evidence . . . that he actually possessed a gun at such meeting.”240  
Subsequently, the government argued that Lowery’s questioning “opened 
the door to evidence” concerning a separate firearm possession charge.241  
Over Lowery’s objection, the court admitted the evidence and allowed the 
government to question Lowery’s former girlfriend about possessing the 
firearm and an officer who found the firearm while searching Lowery’s 
vehicle.242 
To support his entrapment defense, Lowery argued he lacked the intent 
to carry out the robbery and the predisposition to commit the act.243  On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that:  
Evidence tending to prove that Lowery had the ability to bring a necessary 
tool . . . to conduct the proposed stash-house robbery was relevant to the 
question of Lowery’s predisposition to commit the robbery, and Lowery’s 
prior possession of a firearm showed his familiarity with and access to 
weapons.244 
Furthermore, even if the evidence were barred by Rule 404(b), the trial court 
concluded within its discretion that “Lowery opened the door to its 
admission.”245 
McLaurin demonstrates the only method in which the jury should hear 
evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts.246  In practice, the defendant’s 
 
felon.  See id. (identifying the various offenses involved at trial).  McLaurin was subsequently sentenced 
to 151 months imprisonment, and Lowery to 168 months.  Id. 
239. Id.  Although both appealed their convictions, Lowery’s argument is discussed in greater 
detail to illustrate the process of “opening the door.”  See id. at 382 (describing the government’s 
position that Lowery “opened the door to evidence” through cross-examination).  In a separate 
argument, McLaurin also argued that the trial court “violated Rule 404(b) by admitting a judgment and 
commitment order establishing that he had been convicted of common law robbery in 2003.”  Id. 
at 383.  Like it held for Lowery, the Fourth Circuit also held the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by admitting the 404(b) evidence because McLaurin “opened the door.”  Id. at 384. 





245. Id. at 383. 
246. Cf. Capra & Richter, supra note 55, at 787 (suggesting 404(b) should be a rule of exclusion, 
not inclusion). 
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prior bad acts should be admissible only if the defendant opens the door.  
For example, assume a defendant is charged with murder and was previously 
convicted of possession of a controlled substance and domestic violence.  
During the murder trial, the defendant’s counsel questions the arresting 
officer and contends that the only investigative report linking the defendant 
to any criminal activity is a prior incident involving drug possession.247  By 
suggesting the defendant has an immaculate record, the prosecution should 
be permitted to introduce rebuttal evidence of a defendant’s prior acts.  Only 
then should the defendant’s criminal history be admissible. 
If the prosecution alludes to a defendant having past misdeeds, defense 
counsel should move for a mistrial.  Prior to ruling, and out of the jury’s 
presence, the trial judge should determine whether the prosecutor’s 
comments were so egregious as to tip the scale in their favor.  The court 
must conclusively determine whether at any time during the trial, the 
defendant opened the door.  Rather than instructing the jury to disregard 
the prosecutor’s improper comments, the judge should declare a mistrial.  
As exhibited above, instructing juries to disregard or limit certain 
inadmissible evidence is unreliable.  Thus, the only solution that ensures the 
defendant receives a fair, untainted trial is to declare a mistrial. 
The proposed 404(b)(2) language would substantially mirror 404(a)(2)’s 
permitted exceptions.  Because the proposed amendment would not allow 
for a defendant’s prior criminal history to be admitted unless the defendant 
opens the door, Rule 404(b) would no longer need a notice provision.  As a 
replacement, the new rule should include an improper use provision.  This 
provision would instruct the trial court to conduct a review, outside the 
presence of the jury, of the prosecutor’s improper comments in accordance 
with Rule 103(d).248  Accordingly, the new Rule 404(b) would read as 
follows: 
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts. 
(2) Permitted Uses.  A defendant may offer evidence of the 
defendant’s prior crimes, wrongs, or acts, and if the evidence is 
admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it. 
 
247. See, e.g., United States v. Balthazard, 360 F.3d 309, 317 (1st Cir. 2004) (agreeing with the 
trial court that the defendant “opened the door to questioning” about a prior theft report). 
248. See FED. R. EVID. 103(d) (“To the extent practicable, the court must conduct a jury trial 
so that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury by any means.”). 
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(3) Improper Use.  Upon proper objection, the trial court shall 
conduct a hearing in accordance with Rule 103(d).  If the court 
determines the prosecutor’s improper comments regarding the 
defendant’s crimes, wrongs, or other acts would substantially alter the 
jury’s verdict, the court should declare a mistrial.249 
B. Option Two: Limit the Permitted Uses and Increase the Burden of Proof 
Alternatively, Rule 404(b) should be amended to limit the permitted uses 
available to the prosecution and require trial courts to make initial findings 
establishing the defendant committed the alleged prior acts beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Currently, Rule 404(b) allows the prosecution to 
introduce a defendant’s prior bad acts under a non-exhaustive list of 
exceptions.250  As indicated above, the federal evidence rules differ from 
the Texas rules in that federal trial courts are not required to make 
preliminary findings that the defendant committed the alleged prior acts 
beyond a reasonable doubt.251   
In Huddleston v. United States,252 the Supreme Court held trial courts are 
not required to make preliminary findings that the prosecution proved a 
defendant’s prior bad acts “by a preponderance of the evidence before it 
submits the evidence to the jury.”253  According to the Court, requiring trial 
courts to predetermine the prior acts were committed by a preponderance 
of the evidence was “inconsistent with the structure of the Rules of 
Evidence and with the plain language of Rule 404(b).”254  Because 
Rule 404(b)’s language does not plainly necessitate a preliminary showing, 
the Court refused to “superimpose a level of judicial oversight.”255  
Furthermore, the Rule’s legislative history showed Congress’s lack of intent 
“to confer any arbitrary discretion on the trial judge.”256  Although the 
 
249. This proposed language does not incorporate recent amendments approved by the 
Advisory Committee.  Although the amendments were transmitted to Judicial Conference, Congress 
has not approved the amendments. 
250. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (“[E]vidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as 
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack 
of accident.”). 
251. See supra text and accompanying notes p. 117 (noting differences between the Federal and 
Texas rules). 
 252. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
253. Id. at 682. 
254. Id. at 687. 
255. Id. at 688. 
256. Id. 
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Court rejected the petitioner’s arguments, it warned the Government against 
parading “a litany of potentially prejudicial similar acts that have been 
established or connected to the defendant only by unsubstantiated 
innuendo.”257 
Since Huddleston, the Supreme Court has not required a higher standard 
than a preponderance of the evidence.258  Moreover, Congress has yet to 
implement a heightened burden on the prosecution.  In contrast, Texas 
rejects prior act evidence unless proven beyond a reasonable doubt.259  In 
Harrell v. State,260 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined to adopt 
the Huddleston standard.261  Texas traditionally instructed juries from 
considering “extraneous offense evidence unless they believed beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such [acts].”262  By 
requiring a higher standard, the presumption for uncharged and charged 
conduct are equivalent.  Accordingly, the federal rules should emulate 
Texas’s standard for admitting extraneous offense evidence,263 and require 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.   
If the presumption of innocence is to remain an essential component of 
our criminal trial system, judges must exercise their discretion to ensure 
prosecutors adhere to their ethical duties and curb any attempt to misuse 
404(b) evidence.  Courts may do so by strictly enforcing disciplinary 
remedies under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.264  Under 
Disciplinary Rule 7-106 a lawyer may not: “In appearing in his professional 
capacity before a tribunal, . . . [s]tate or allude to any matter that he has no 
reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case or that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.”265  Violating this rule implicates both 
 
257. Id. at 689. 
258. See United States v. Gutierrez-Mendez, 752 F.3d 418, 424 (5th Cir. 2014) (reciting the 
Huddleston standard for admitting 404(b) evidence); Michael D. Dean, Dealing with Extrinsic Act Evidence, 
28-SUM CRIM. JUST. 34, 35 (2013) (stating “the [U.S.] Supreme Court has held that the government 
does not need to ‘prove’” 404(b) acts past a preponderance of the evidence). 
259. See Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“This Court has long 
required that juries be instructed not to consider extraneous offense evidence unless they believed 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such offense.”). 
260. Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 
261. See id. at 160 (“We decline to follow Huddleston to this extent.”). 
262. Id. at 157. 
263. Id. 
264. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106 (C)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) 
(defining structures lawyers are bound to in dealing with the misuse of a defendant’s prior acts). 
265. Id. 
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constitutional and ethical dilemmas.266  In fact, courts have overturned jury 
verdicts tainted by unfair arguments.267   
Unlike defense attorneys, prosecutors are only given one opportunity to 
prove their case.268  Consequently, their desire to secure a conviction often 
causes them to deviate beyond the confines of their ethical obligations.269  
Those who “smuggl[e] propensity evidence into a criminal prosecution” 
undermine the “cherished notions of fairness,” and undoubtedly violate 
their ethical duties.270  Prosecutors are obliged by law to represent society 
zealously.271  But defense attorneys represent the people just as prosecutors 
do; only they do so one person at a time.272   
VI.    CONCLUSION 
An essential prerequisite of a fair and impartial trial is that the defendant 
not be judged for past misdeeds but tried solely for the crime charged.273  
 
266. Mary Beth Meyer, Unringing the Bell: Enforcing Model Rule 3.4(e) As an Alternative to Trial 
Reversal for Attorneys’ Improper Argument, 11 J. LEGAL PROF. 187, 218 (1986) (addressing the challenges 
courts face when faced with attorney misconduct under Rule 3.4 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct). 
267. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935) (overturning tainted jury verdicts due to 
unfair arguments); Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. 
REV. 629, 644–47 (1972) (offering remedies for prosecutorial misconduct). 
268. See Henning, supra note 188, at 798 (“Unlike other attorneys, the prosecutor operates 
within a system that, for the most part, gives the government only one chance at proving its case.”). 
269. Id. at 797.  As one commenter noted: 
The temptation to overstep, however, by imparting to the trier of fact one’s firmly held belief in 
the defendant’s guilt, even at the risk of allowing advocacy to degenerate into prejudicial 
argumentation or unfair commentary on the evidence and credibility of the witnesses is 
omnipresent.  Although the presence of the judge is moderating influence on both sides, there 
are numerous instances of overreaching by lawyers during trial.  Every objection sustained by the 
judge or sanction for improper conduct is, in a sense, a result of one attorney’s transgression, 
whether it be characterized as an innocent mistake, aggressive advocacy, or willful misconduct. 
Id. 
270. See Uviller, supra note 28, at 868 (recognizing the negative effects associated with smuggling 
propensity evidence into a criminal prosecutions). 
271. Henning, supra note 188, at 797. 
272. See Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 358 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Federal 
prosecutors, when they rise in court, represent the people of the United States.  But so do defense 
lawyers—one at a time.  In my view, the Court’s opinion pays insufficient respect to the importance 
of an independent bar as a check on prosecutorial abuse and government overreaching.”). 
273. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (“Although . . . ‘propensity 
evidence’ is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged—or that, 
uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment—creates a 
prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance.” (citation omitted)). 
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The Federal Rules of Evidence ensure a defendant’s rights are protected and 
that presumption of innocence remains an essential component within our 
judicial system.  Additionally, the federal evidence rules balance the scales 
between those charged with a crime and those seeking justice.  However, 
Rule 404(b) allows prosecutors to step outside the confines of their ethical 
duties and undermine a defendant’s guaranteed constitutional rights.274 
Rule 404(b) continues to be one of the most litigated evidence rules.275  
So long as 404(b) remains unchanged, courts and scholars will further debate 
various solutions to prevent misusing a defendant’s prior misdeeds.276  
Most agree that Rule 404(b) must be amended.  Unless Rule 404(b) is 
amended, prosecutors will continue to taint the jury’s opinion by smuggling 
propensity evidence into a defendant’s trial.   
Requiring the defendant to open the door, rather than allowing the 
prosecution to introduce a defendant’s prior bad acts under the guise of 
“another purpose,”277 is a practical solution against misusing Rule 404(b).  
In addition, amending 404(b) to include a misuse provision would further 
reduce the chances that prosecutors improperly comment on the 
defendant’s prior bad acts.  In the alternative, Rule 404(b) must be revised 
to require prosecutors to prove the defendant committed the alleged prior 
bad acts beyond a reasonable doubt.  In conjunction with increasing the 
burden of proof, courts must protect against blatant prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Where prosecutors willfully disregard their ethical duties in 
order to secure a guilty verdict, courts must serve as an additional check 
against an overreaching government. 
As detailed above, a defendant’s criminal history weighs heavily on the 
jury’s outcome.278  Once a prosecutor exposes a defendant’s prior criminal 
acts, it is nearly impossible to “unring [the] bell.”279  As Justice Jackson 
 
 274.  See supra Part IV. 
275. Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(B), 
78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 211 (2005). 
276. See Capra & Richter, supra note 55, at 828 (proposing a more protective balancing test for 
criminal defendants); Tortora, supra note 24, at 1497 (urging jurisdictions to “adopt a minimal standard 
of proof to limit the risk of prejudice to the defendant”); Froncek, supra note 21, at 613 (offering a 
“proper approach to resolve the [circuit split] question”). 
277. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
278. See United States v. Cote, 744 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding the other evidence, 
“was likely to have prejudiced the jury’s consideration of [the defendant’s] guilt.”); see also Abraham P. 
Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 
135, 137 (1989) (“Extrinsic crime evidence does weigh too heavily with the jury.  It causes the jury to 
prejudge the case and to deny the defendant a fair trial on the specific charge in the indictment.”). 
279. Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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articulated, “[t]he naïve assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome 
by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated 
fiction.”280  As the Fifth Circuit advised: “It is better to follow the rules 
than to try to undo what has been done.”281  Because once you “throw a 
skunk into the jury box, you can’t instruct the jury not to smell it.”282 
  
 
280. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (citations omitted); see Nash v. 
United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (noting that asking jurors to disregard a defendant’s 
prior bad acts requires “mental gymnastics which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody’s 
else.”). 
281. Dunn, 307 F.2d at 886. 
282. Id. 
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